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NOTE AND COMMENT

PATENT LAw-SXCZT USZ AS Amcn= RiGHT TO A PATNT.-An unusually obvious piece of judicial legislation, of practical importance to the manufacturing world, was promulgated in the case of Macbeth-Evans Glass Co.
v. General Electric Co., 246 Fed. 69.q. The facts were that in i903 Macbeth
had invented a process for making glass. Since that time the plaintiff company. of which Macbeth was president, had been using that process. This
use had, however, been "secret". In i910 an employee of the plaintiff revealed the process to the Jefferson Glass Co., which 4t once began to use it,
but on application of the Macbeth Co. the state court enjoined the Jefferson
Co. from further use of .the process and from disclosing it to others. Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76. The secret of the process
was not revealed by the proceedings in this suit. It does not appear how
the General Electric Co. acquired knowledge of the process; whether it did
learn the secret of the Macbeth.process, or evolved a similar process by its
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own independent efforts. Macbeth applied for a patent in 1913 and when
it was issued the Macbeth Co., as his assignee, brought this suit for infringement. The General Electric Co. defended on the ground that Macbeth had
lost his right to a patent, by his fkilure to apply for one' reasonably soon after
he had perfected his invention, and that, consequently, the patent issued to
him was void.
The statutes provide that the first and original inventor may obtain a patent upon application, unless his invention has-been in public use or on sale
more than two years prior to his application, or unless he is proved to have
abandoned the invention. R. S. 4886. These are the only exceptions stated.
Macbeth was conceded to be the first and original inventor. It was admitted
also that the invention had never been sold-although its products had been.
.Macbeth was obviously not proved to have abandoned his invention. On the
contrary he was using it, and displayed a very vital interest in it. "The constant effort made to preserve the secret was inconsistent wvith intent to abandon the invention".
The court might have held that the so-called secret use of the invention
by the Macbeth Co. for the ten years preceding the application was in fact
a public use. This would have had the authority of Perkins v. Nassua Card
Co., 2 Fed. 451. In that case the invention was used in a factory employing
a score of workmen, all of whom" had keys to the building, and to which
visitors were occasionally admitted.. This was held to be a public use, such
as would preclude the inventor from a patent, because "when the public have
had means of knowledge they have had knowledge of the invention." So
also, in Egg&ert v. Lippmann, io4 U. S. 333, the invention of a type of corsetsteel was held to have been in "public use" without further evidence than that
the inventor's wife wore a pair of corsets containing such steels. (Compare
also Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556.) But the court did not choose to adopt
this solution of the case. On the contrary, it'was expressly assumed that the
use ot the invention had been a secret use. Still more convincingly might
the court have held that the use by the Jefferson Co. and by the General
Electric Co. was truly a public use. Neither the consent of the inventor
(Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U. S. 267, 124 U. S. 694) nor the extent of the use
(Swain v. Holyoke Mach. Co., iog Fed. 154) is material in the question of
public usse. But this simple solution also the court ignored. The case was
deliberately made to turn upon the issue of "whether one who has discovered
and perfected an invention can employ it secretly more than nine years for
purposes only of profit, and then, upon encountering difficulty in preserving
his secret, rightfully secure a patent"
Since -the right to a patent had not been forfeited through public use nor
abandonment of the invention, it must have been lost, if at all, in some other
way. As the statute expressly mentions these two causes of forfeiture and
no others, it might be supposed that only these were intended as causes of
forfeiture; the maxim expressio unius might be supposed to apply. Even
more indubitably might it he supposed that the emphasis placed on public use
by the statute would preclude loss of right through secret use. The decisions
prior to the one under discussion did proceed upon this supposition. Neither
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secret use nor public knowledge has been held a cause of forfeiture. Thus,
in Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 46. the court said, as a basis for rejecting certain
evidence, "Inventors may if they can, keep their invention secret; and if they
do for any length of time, they do not forfeit their right to apply for a patent,
unless another in the mean time has made the invention and secured by patent the exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented improvement.
Within that rule and subject to that condition, inventors may delay to apply
for a patent." In Parks v. Booth, io2 U. S. 96, io5, the same judge repeated,
"Inventors may, if they can, keep their inventions secret; but if they do not,
and suffer the same to go into public use for a period exceeding what is
allowed by the Patent Act, they forfeit their right to a patent." So also, in
Eggbert v. Lippmnann. supra, Mr. Justice MImLER, dissenting from the finding
that a certain use had in fact been public, makes the apparently undisputed
statement, that "the word public is therefore, an important member of the
sentence" and a secret use will not preclude a patent. In Eliabeth v. Pavilig
Co., 97 U. S. 126, 136, it was held that not only was the word public important, but "use" was equally so, and that'mere public knowledge of the invention, though for more than two years prior to the application would not affect
the patent. There nust, the court said, explicitly, be a use by the public
before the court can imply either an abandonment of the invention or a, loss
of the right to a patent. The only authority in any way opposed to this interpretation is dictum. In Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, for instance, the
decision was ifi favor of the patentee, but the court did say that one "may
forfeit his rights as an inventor * * * by an attempt to withhold the benefit
of his improvement from the public until a similar or the same improvement
shall have been made and introduced by others". (Present writer's italics.)
There is no evidence whatsoever in the Macbeth case that the invention was
ever made by anyone but Macbeth.
Most of this authority was considered in the principal case. It was not
overruled, but was declared somehow to accord with the proposition that a
thoroughly secret, non-public use, without any proof of abandonment of the
invention may deprive the inventor of his statutory right to a patent. Freed
from restriction of this authority the court took the position that it would be
out of accord with sound public policy to allow an inventor to maintain a
virtual monopoly of his device by using it in secret for a number of years,
and then to acquire a statutory monopoly for a longer period. Accordingly,
the court read into the statute a provision that the right of a first and original
inventor to a patent will be forfeited by secret use for purposes of profit.
This interpretative legislation is quite in analogous accord with the decisions
by which it has been settled that, as between rival applicants for a patent,
the "first and original inventor" is not the one who first invented the device,
but the one who first reduced the device to actual practice. Automatic W~eighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Co., I66 Fed. 288; One-Piece Lens Co. v.
Bisight Co., 246 Fed. 45o. As the decision was virtually affirmed by the Supreme Court in refusing a writ of certiorari,246 U. S. 659, and was cited with
approval in E. W. Bliss Co. v. Southern Can Co., 251 Fed. 903, 907, it will
J.B. W.
probably stand as the proper interpretation of the statute.

